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Abstract 
Anglo-America and Spanish America have profoundly different approaches to public policy in the oil sector. Anglo-America 
relies, on the one hand, on market mechanisms to allocate risk and 
* It was Herbert Eugene Bolton at the University of California, Berkeley, who, 
around 1910, established the field of the comparative study of the Americas. He 
published a book that consisted only of his outline of the subject as he saw it at that 
moment. 
I had the privilege of studying with one of Bolton's students, the colonialist John 
Tate Lanning. I mention these details only by way of establishing my own long inter-
est in comparative history. 
When I was a Fulbright Exchange Scholar at the Facultad de Filosoffa y Letras 
UNAM in 1973 and 1974 I proposed to the U.S. Embassy's Bicentennial Commis-
sion a project that would assemble the primary documentation in a comparative way 
of the U.S. and Mexican wars of independence. These documents were assembled 
and published by SEP-SETENTAS a few years later. With the coming of the bicenten-
nial of the Mexican war of independence these volumes should be republished. 
In 1910 the oil industry barely existed, and, in any case, Bolton's interests were not 
in the areas of technology and industrial organization. 
So the task of comparative history falls on this generation. In this paper I address some 
of the soft, cultural, organizational and policy issues that, taken together, show the great 
divide that exists between Anglo-American and Spanish-American oil industries. 
** University of California, Los Angeles. Program on Mexico 
459 
460 George Baker 
reward, and, on the other, to a corps of career civi I servants to serve as 
independent regulators. Spanish America, in contrast, eschews mar-
ket solutions and the State is the primary, if not sole, risk-taker and 
beneficiary of investments-but without the benefit of professional 
regulators and independent regulatory institutions. Spanish America 
goes one step further and elevates the national oil company (NOC) and 
its official labor union to a privileged ideological and economic status 
within society. 
While there are certainly historical roots that, if understood, would 
explain many of these differences, the immediate task before social sci-
entrsts concerns the consequences of such differences for the future. 
The hypothesis to be explored here is this: the observed differences 
in public policy and in corporate governance, culture and oversight 
generally work to the disadvantage of Spanish American national oil 
companies. 
To start the discussion we may take as an example the adage in the 
extractive end of the oil industry that "the diversity of ideas finds oil." 
Oil companies operating in extractive activities in Anglo-America (ir-
respective of their original nationality) put this adage into practice by 
hiring managers and executives from the global labor pool; whereas 
in Spanish America the rule is to hire only local nationals as employ-
ees. The rest of the world's talent is hired as consultants and contrac-
tors; but without the benefit for the NOCs of making use of their deci-
sion-making and corporate management skills. 
This difference in hiring policy does not come cost-free: it might 
make a difference of US$0.25/bbl in exploration and production costs, 
a rate that for a producer of 1,000,000 b/d would mean $250,000 of 
unnecessary costs each day. 
At present, we have no empirical methodology for quantifying these 
differences but that limitation should not impede heuristic inquiry. 
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Introduction 
In his presentation to the Senate Energy Committee on Nov. 22, 
2006, outgoing Pemex CEO Luis Ramfrez Corzo made several of the 
observations and arguments mentioned in this report. He emphasized 
that the technology possessed by the Anglo-American oil companies1 
is not available commercially, but is something reserved by the com-
panies to gain access to the reserves of other countries. This way of 
putting things is only half-true, because the matter of Anglo-American 
competitiveness is not essentially a matter of technology. 
The features that make up the competitiveness of Anglo-American 
oil companies of all sizes2 arose in competitive environments. We 
suppose that it is impossible for these features to be imported into a 
noncompetitive environment and still serve their original purpose. 
Internally, Anglo-American oil companies are better able to assess 
probabilities of commercial success in E&P operations than are NOCs; 
but the reasons why this is true go far beyond matters of data and al-
gorithms. Said differently, Anglo-American oil companies have better 
filters to protect them against investment decisions advocated by 
champions or special interests. (In Pemex, it has been observed that 
1 The term "Anglo-American oil company" refers to those companies of whatever 
their parent-company nationality who have upstream (extractive) activities in the 
United States or Canada. Of Latin American companies, only Petrobras has an 
upstream investment in the U.S. (in the Gulf of Mexico). PDVSA has a powerful com-
mercial presence, but in the downstream areas of refining and distribution. Pemex 
has a joint investment with Shell in a large refinery near Houston, but Pemex has no 
retai I operations in the U.S. 
2 International oil companies, like shirts, come in four sizes: XL, L, Mand S. Each 
of these company sizes has its own economy of scale. Where the XL-sized company 
(of which there are less than a dozen) is efficient in frontier areas like the ANS and 
deepwater, the S-sized company (of which there are thousands) is efficient in small 
and marginal fields in mature basins. See Baker and Wilson (1996). 
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some infrastructure has been built on the basis of information gained 
only from exploratory wells, with the result that the investment cre-
ated unnecessary over-capacity. The true capacity needed would have 
been seen had the investment decision been delayed to the point of 
having data also from delimiting wells). 
Areas of contrast between Anglo-
and Spanish-American oil companies 
The historical weight of English 
The international oil industry was initially the work of native Eng-
lish speakers, and, owing to the early successful operations in the 
United States, English has remained the lengua franca of the global oil 
industry. Anglo-American companies have an advantage over Span-
ish-American companies in having an unlimited supply of native 
speakers of English in the labor pool. But the matter goes beyond the 
availability of native speakers born in the United States (or its posses-
sions) and Canada. Oil companies from all over the world have of-
fices in Houston, and all employees speak English. 
There are multiple advantages for these companies in having a 
common language with which to communicate. It means that profes-
sionals can form networks around the world; it means that they can 
attend, and contribute to, professional conferences without waiting 
for translations; and it means that they can work together in real-time 
oilfield operations without the burden of translators. 
In Spanish-America, this situation is reversed: the top management 
speaks English, but the lower 95% of the employees of national oil 
companies are exclusively Spanish speakers.3 
3 An exception to this pattern doubtless existed in Venezuela for a time after the 
The Oil Industry in Anglo-America and Spanish-America 463 
Diversity of backgrounds and nationalities 
Anglo-American oil companies have a strong corps of professionals 
hired from around the world. We do not know the statistic, but we guess 
that in the major IOCs have employees from at least 50 countries. 
Diversity of nationalities means diversity of temperament and way 
of thinking; and, as someone famously said, "Diversity finds oil." In 
the NOCs, in contrast, one often finds a "party-line" mentality of mono-
lithic thinking. 
Corporate culture and the management of disagreement 
A topic that deserves attention by social scientists is the manage-
ment of disagreement in the upstream end of the oil industry. As drill-
ing prospects in many cases require budgets of hundreds of millions 
of dollars, there is great incentive to be right about the commercial 
viability of the prospect. 
The question concerns how organizations manage the process of 
disagreement in relation to the commercial viability of prospects. 
It may be that the higher faculties of judgment in such matters are 
brought into play in an individual when there is a strong motive of 
self-interest-such as promotion, bonuses or the risk of losing his job.4 
But the matter goes beyond what brings out the best analytical 
faculty in an individual; it concerns how an organization evaluates 
and responds to disagreement. Sometimes companies are profoundly 
mistaken in how they handle disagreement: A retired chief economist 
of Chevron would tell his class in petroleum geology at U.C. Berkeley 
in the 1990s that "we tried to convince management of the commer-
nationalization of the several oil companies in 1976, as managers had had careers 
in English-speaking companies. 
4 In a private conversation in mid-2006 with a senior Pemex petroleum engineer, 
consideration was given to printing a poster that read: "Just one disagreement be-
tween two geologists could lead to the discovery of a new oil field." 
464 George Baker 
cial viability of the Alaskan North Slope, but they did not accept our 
recommendations." One consequence was that this super-giant oil 
region was developed by BP and ARCO (later acquired by BP). 
The deepwater areas of the Gulf of Mexico is a recent development 
where companies from around the world have come to participate, 
both as operators and as suppliers. 
Corporate learning strategies in Anglo- and Spanish-America 
It is in the matter of corporate learning strategy that the biggest dif-
ferences are to be found between Anglo- and Spanish-America. We 
shall mention three: 
Joint ventures between companies 
In the Anglo-American oi I marketplace smaller companies are able 
to leverage their property rights and expertise into relationships with 
much larger companies, thereby gaining access to operating practices 
which, otherwise, would be impossible to acquire. The availability of 
this learning opportunity is based on the relationship existing on a 
commercial basis; that is, each party has an opportunity to profit 
from-as well as lose-its invested capital. 
In Spanish-America, joint ventures represent the exceptions to a 
general pattern of the NOC carrying out its exploration and production 
efforts alone. In Argentina, a possible joint venture between YPF and 
an international company turned into an outright sale to Repsol (now 
Repsol-YPF). 
Worldwide hiring of critical labor force 
On one occasion Statoil, the Norwegian state oil company, hired 
an American executive, formerly with Amoco, as the director of world-
wide exploration. This single example illustrates the power of the con-
viction that native language and passport color matter much less than 
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the ability of an individual to contribute critical abilities in a large 
organization. 
In Spanish-America, in contrast, the worldwide labor pool comes 
into play in the form of contractors and consultants. While these ven-
dors can perform a wide variety of tasks, the critical tasks for which 
they are needed-namely, their decision-making and managerial 
abilities-are not brought into play. 
In Anglo-America executives of oil companies are allowed to re-
tain their positions indefinitely, based on performance. In the national 
oil companies of Spanish America executives serve at the pleasure of 
the President; and, routinely, they are switched out with every change 
of government. 5 
Culture of unique solutions 
It is common that in the development of a new oilfield there will 
be the requirement for original and often unique solutions that may 
never be replicated a second time. One example is the challenge of 
developing the Ekofisk oilfield in Norway, a major field discovered 
by Phillips Petroleum Company (and currently operated by Cono-
coPhillips). At the time, Norway had a rule that all oil had to be 
brought onshore before it c9uld be exported. Between the field and 
the shoreline there was a deep canyon known as the Norwegian 
Trench. At the time of the discovery there was no known method for 
bridging the trench. Nevertheless, the Norwegian government and 
Phillips signed an agreement authorizing development with the re-
quirement that a solution would be developed in a timely manner-
which it was. 
5 In Mexico, in nearly seventy years, there has been only one case where a director 
general of Pemex has been asked to stay in office for more than one term: Jaime 
Bermudez served from 1946-1958. 
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Another example is the development of the Thunder Horse semi-
submersible oil platform production platform, the largest in the world. 
There were more than one hundred innovations marked "Mark 1.0" in 
the development of this platform. 
It is a normal expectation in the large companies that some inven-
tion or adaptation will be needed to develop a new oilfield. 
In Spanish-America, the rule is to bring in waves of contractors, 
each with its own products, services and pricing policies. The bias of 
the contractor is toward the past: What can he sell to the customer 
that he has already developed? Hence, the entrepreneurial spirit of 
inventiveness is not brought into play. 
An exception in Latin America is the Petrobras Research Center 
(CENPES), which was founded in 1955, a few years before the Mexican 
Petroleum Institute (IMP). Unlike the IMP and unlike other such insti-
tutes in Latin America, CENPES, it has produced major technological 
results that have permitted Petrobras to assume a leadership position 
in deepwater exploration and development. 
The advantage of public oversight 
The dimension of public oversight is another area where Anglo-
American oil companies have an advantage over Spanish-American 
ones. 
Oversight is provided in three dimensions, two provided by mar-
kets, and one provided by government regulation. 
Markets provide instant scores as marked by investors as to the 
wisdom of decision-making in commercial organizations. Statoil and 
Petrobras ownership remained majority-owned by the State; neverthe-
less, the securitization of just a portion of the shares of a previously 
100% state owned company had a profound impact on company pro-
ductivity. "The effect of partial ownership by the stock market inves-
tors was electric up and down the company," recalled the Mexico 
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country manager of the Norwegian Norsk Hydro in 2005.6 The stock-
market valuation of whatever percentage that is floated goes up or 
down in parallel with the judgments and expectations of investors. 
Another dimension of partial securitization is the practice of share-
holder voting rights. Major investors sit on the boards of directors. In 
Mexico, President Vicente Fox, at the beginning of his term, tried to 
add members to Pemex's Administrative Council, but political opposi-
tion forced him to cancel this initiative. 
The typical pattern in Spanish-American national oil companies is 
for the governing councils to be staffed with government officials loy-
al to the incumbent party. In such cases, the oversight benefit is mini-
mal, if any at all. 
Areas of contrast between Anglo- and Spanish-American 
approaches to public administration in the oil industry 
As public lands and national resources are involved, the governments 
in Anglo-America have just as large an incentive to monitor the ac-
tivities of oil companies who are pursuing exploration and production 
activities. 
The defining feature of public administration of the oil sector is the 
existence of career civil servants who are specialists in the area of 
regulation. In the United States these civil servants are found at both 
the federal and state levels. The best-known regulatory and oversight 
agencies are the Mineral Management Service (MMS) at the federal 
level and the Texas Railroad Commission at the state level. 
6 It was just short of astonishing that two Norwegian oil companies which were 
both created decades after Pemex should be at such an advanced competitive stage 
in the oil industry that they could afford to have business development offices in 
Mexico City. 
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A second feature is a general pattern of neutrality on the part of the 
government regarding the nationality of the oil company that seeks to 
participate in the development of national resources. 7 
A third feature is the neutrality and non-interference by the govern-
ment in matters related to labor markets. A characteristic of the labor 
market in the Anglo-American oil industry is the absence of dominant 
labor unions. The entire industry is an "open shop." 
In Spanish-America, these three features are almost entirely lack-
ing: There is no career civil service path as a petroleum regulator. In 
Mexico there is a downstream regulator, the Energy Regulatory Com-
mission, but this body's role to date has been to regulate private inves-
tors in the energy sector, not the activities of the major state-owned 
actors, Pemex and CFE. 
The opposition to the participation of foreign companies in up-
stream activities on an equity basis is most pronounced in Mexico, 
but for reasons that are not fully understood.8 In other Spanish-speak-
ing countries in the region, such as Colombia, Ecuador-and even 
Cuba-the governments have concluded that there are more gains 
than costs in allowing private investment in the oil industry.9 
In Mexico, there are "official" labor unions that are recognized by 
the government and that have the right to negotiate with manage-
ment regarding wages and benefits. In the oil industry the STPRM has 
7 An exception to this pattern was the embarrassing reaction in the U.S. Congress 
to the proposal by a Chinese company to acquire UNOCAL in 2005. 
8 Mexico is long overdue for radical revisionism related to the Expropriation. 
One could make the argument, for example, that Cardenas, had he been able to 
anticipate the evolution of the oil industry in the coming decades-and see the rise 
in the ability of the State to protect its interests-would have chosen NOT to have 
expropriated the oil companies. 
9 The situation in Venezuela is more fluid, as President Hugo Chavez, according 
to his critics, is trying to renationalize the oil industry, after a period of more than 
a decade when private oil companies were invited to bid on marginal blocks and 
frontier areas in the Orinoco Oil Belt. 
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been the "official" representative of labor, despite decades of peti-
tions by dissident groups to be allowed partial recognition by man-
agement.10 
In Mexico the labor union has privileges unheard of in Anglo-
America, such as the right to have five sit on members on Pemex's 
administrative councils. 11 More costly for Pemex is the lack of what 
is called "labor mobility," meaning the right to management to reas-
sign a worker from on facility or another. The Union has held to the 
position that if Pemex needs another worker in a nearby facility, 
then it should hire a worker specifically for that facility; the fact that 
there might be idle workers with the required skill set cannot be 
considered. 
Conclusions 
Differences are not cost-free 
We shall direct most of our comments to the Mexican case. 
Production costs 
We imagine that Anglo-American oil companies have an advan-
tage over Spanish-American ones of US$1.70/ barrel in production 
costs. (Table 1 ).12 
10 George Grayson observed how Pemex "helped retard the development of an 
anti-STPRM movement by disciplining or transferring workers who run afoul of 
union leaders." Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh, 1980), p. 99. 
11 But, as this council exists largely for ceremonial functions-and lacks indepen-
dent managerial or budgetary authority-it matters little how many union members 
there might be. 
12 Pemex reports "production costs" in the neighborhood of US$4/bbl but these 
costs are purely for consumables associated with the immediate costs of extraction; 
and do not include investment, management or financial costs. 
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Exploratory success 
Pemex has had a low exploration success rate for decades, in part 
because "low" is always relative to the huge size of Cantarell which 
has provided some 50% of total national oil production. 
Further, it has been observed that in recent years Pemex average 
discovery size has been decreasing, a consequence of looking for ever 
smaller targets of exploration. 
In any case, where Pemex has a proved reserve-rate of 20% which 
is often lower), Anglo-American companies typically have success 
rates for proved reserves well above 50%. 13 
Peak oil 
The general idea of the Peak Oil movement is that the world 
economy is headed to an ultimate resource constraint. 14 In Mexico, 
because of the dominance of the supergiant field Cantarell in Pe-
mex's production portfolio, the decline in Cantarell beginning in 
2004 was taken as a sign that Mexican oil production had peaked. 
(Fig. 1 ). 
The subject of how fast Cantarell will decline is the topic of intense 
controversy in Mexico (Fig. 2) and intense concern among Pemex's 
crude oil customers. 
A corollary of the Peak Oil story is that a resource constraint may 
first appear as a reduction of crude oil exports. Since 2006 Pemex's oil 
exports have required 100% or more of Cantarell's declining produc-
tion (Fig. 3 ). 
13 Pemex's claim of 57% of reserve replacement in 2005 was based on the 
so-called 3P measure consisting of the sum of proved, probable and "possible" re-
serves. Pemex proposes to achieve 100% reserve replacement by 2010, but, again, 
much of the replacement volumes will still be in the category of "possible." 
14 Peak Oil societies exist all over the world. The annual international conference is 
scheduled for Oct. 17-20, 2007, in Houston (http://www.aspo-usa.com). 
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Reserve levels, meanwhile, have fallen to their lowest level in the 
previous quarter-century. Measured as the ration of production to 
proved reserves, the amount of oil left for Pemex to produce is equiv-
alent to less than ten years of production at current rates. 
Public oversight 
Here is perhaps the most distinguishing feature of Spanish American 
oil companies: there monopoly on technical expertise and data. This 
situation does not exist in Anglo-America where in federal, state and 
provincial governments there is a strong corps of technical staff. To il-
lustrate, consider that in the State of Texas, there is the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Geology, complete with extensive databases, technical staff and 
independent publications. In Mexico, in contrast, the Energy Ministry 
(SENER) has a high staff turnover and its publications are entirely deriva-
tive of information provided by Pemex and CFE, the state power utility.15 
There is a good reason for this monopoly: there is no career stabil-
ity in a government post outside of the state energy companies. 
Strategic alliances 
In the matter of strategic alliances, here again is a great gap in the 
oil cultures of Anglo- and Spanish-America. Where in Anglo-Ameri-
ca joint ventures between oil companies based on shared risk and 
reward are common, in Spanish-America they are less so-and in 
Mexico not at all. 
Outlook 
On May 1, 2006, the government of President Evo Morales an-
nounced the nationalization of Bolivia's oilfields. On the same day, 
15 There is no full-time petroleum engineer or geologist in the Mexican energy 
ministry. 
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the annual Offshore Technology Conference opened in Houston. In 
these two events, the distance between the Spanish-American and 
Anglo-American oil cultures were plainly and disturbingly visible. 
It has been widely observed that, increasingly, the access to the 
world's petroleum resources is being controlled by national oil com-
panies. In Mexico, since 1970, there have been no private interests 
permitted in the upstream. 
At present, Pemex is betting on the possibility that it will be able to 
learn from contractors and the oil companies the secrets to deepwater 
oil production without having to share petroleum rent or production. 
Most industry observers believe this strategy is an expensive gamble, 
but it is a gamble entirely consistent with the tradition of State domi-
nation of the oil industry that is found throughout the Spanish-Ameri-
can world. 
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Tables and figures 
Competitive advantages of Anglo-American 
oil companies in the upstream 
Values are heuristic for a lower order of magnitude 
(US$/bbl) 
Corporate culture 
Efficient management of public relations 
English skills 
Diversity of backgrounds 
Career paths for core-businesses 
Strict investment culture 
Performance orientation 
Subtotal 
Intellectual property 
Databases 
Subtotal 
Science and technology 
Research capability 
Integration capability 
Subtotal 
Business skills 
Ability to manage contractors 
Lower cost of internal funds 
Ability to cooperate in joint ventures 
Subtotal 
$0.08 
$0.15 
$0.08 
$0.05 
$0.15 
$0.13 
$0.08 
$0.13 
$0.38 
$0.15 
$0.05 
$0.30 
$0.63 
$0.08 
$0.50 
$0.50 
473 
Total advantage $1.70 
Data: Heuristic (the author) 
Table 1. Competitive advantages of Anglo-American oil companies in the upstream. 
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Figure 1. Peak Oil in Cantarell in 2004. 
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